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Abstract. Face anti-spoofing (FAS) plays a vital role in securing the
face recognition systems from presentation attacks. Most existing FAS
methods capture various cues (e.g., texture, depth and reflection) to dis-
tinguish the live faces from the spoofing faces. All these cues are based
on the discrepancy among physical materials (e.g., skin, glass, paper and
silicone). In this paper we rephrase face anti-spoofing as a material recog-
nition problem and combine it with classical human material percep-
tion [1], intending to extract discriminative and robust features for FAS.
To this end, we propose the Bilateral Convolutional Networks (BCN),
which is able to capture intrinsic material-based patterns via aggregating
multi-level bilateral macro- and micro- information. Furthermore, Multi-
level Feature Refinement Module (MFRM) and multi-head supervision
are utilized to learn more robust features. Comprehensive experiments
are performed on six benchmark datasets, and the proposed method
achieves superior performance on both intra- and cross-dataset testings.
One highlight is that we achieve overall 11.3±9.5% EER for cross-type
testing in SiW-M dataset, which significantly outperforms previous re-
sults. We hope this work will facilitate future cooperation between FAS
and material communities.
1 Introduction
In recent years, face recognition has been widely used in various interactive and
payment scene due to its high accuracy and convenience. However, such bio-
metric system is vulnerable to presentation attacks (PAs). Typical examples of
physical presentation attacks include print, video replay, 3D masks and makeup.
In order to detect such PAs and secure the face recognition system, face anti-
spoofing (FAS) has attracted more attention from both academia and industry.
In the past decade, several hand-crafted feature based [2,3,4,5,6,7] and deep
learning based [8,9,10,11] methods have been proposed for presentation attack
detection (PAD). On one hand, the classical hand-crafted descriptors leverage
local relationship among the neighbours as the discriminative features, which
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Fig. 1. (a) Face anti-spoofing can be regarded as a binary classification (live or spoof-
ing) problem, which relies on the intrinsic cues such as rPPG, depth, reflection and so
on. (b) Face anti-spoofing can be also treated as a material perception problem.
is robust for describing the detailed invariant information (e.g., color texture,
moire´ pattern and noise artifacts) between the live and spoofing faces. On the
other hand, due to the stacked convolution operations with nonlinear activation,
the convolutional neural networks (CNN) hold strong representation abilities
to distinguish the bona fide from PA. However, most existing CNN and hand-
crafted features are designed for universal image recognition tasks, which might
not represent fine-grained spoofing patterns in FAS task.
According to the known intrinsic cues in face anti-spoofing task, many state-
of-the-art methods introduced task-oriented priori knowledge for feature repre-
sentation. As shown in Fig. 1(a), there are three famous human-defined cues
(i.e., rPPG, depth and reflection) for FAS task. Firstly, frequency distribution
dissimilarity of rPPG signals [12,13,14,15] recovered from live skin surface and
spoofing face can be utilized as there are no or weaker blood volume changes
in spoofing faces. Secondly, structural facial depth difference between live and
spoofing faces [14,16] can be adopted as significant cue as most spoofing faces
are broadcasted in plane presentation attack instruments (PAIs). Thirdly, re-
flectance difference [17,18] is also one kind of reliable cues as human facial skin
and spoofing surfaces react differently to changes in illumination. Despite the
human-defined cues are helpful to enhance the modeling capability respectively,
it is still difficult to describe intrinsic and robust features for FAS task.
An interesting and essential question for FAS task is how human
beings differentiate live or spoofing faces, and what can be learned by
machine intelligent systems? In real-world cases, spoofing faces are always
broadcasted by physical spoofing carriers (e.g., paper, glass screen and resin
mask), which have obvious material properties difference with human facial skin.
Such difference can be explicitly described as human-defined cues (e.g., rPPG,
depth and reflection) or implicitly learned according to the material property
uniqueness of structural live facial skin. Therefore, as illustrated in Fig. 1(b), we
assume that discrepancy of the structural materials between human facial skin
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and physical spoofing carriers are the essence of distinguishing live faces from
spoofing ones.
Motivated by the discussions above, we rephrase face anti-spoofing task as
structural material recognition problem and our goal is to learn intrinsic and
robust features for distinguishing structural facial skin material from the others
(i.e., materials for physical spoofing carriers). According to the study inspired
by classical human material perception [1], bilateral filtering plays a vital role
in representing macro- and micro- cues for various materials. In this paper, we
integrate traditional bilateral filtering operator into the state-of-the-art FAS deep
learning framework, intending to help networks to learn more intrinsic material-
based patterns. Our contributions include:
– We design novel Bilateral Convolutional Networks (BCN), which is able to
capture intrinsic material-based patterns via aggregating multi-level bilateral
macro- and micro- information.
– We propose to use Multi-level Feature Refinement Module (MFRM) and ma-
terial based multi-head supervision to further boost the performance of BCN.
The former one refines the multi-scale features via reassembling weights of
local neighborhood while the latter forces the network to learn robust shared
features for multi-head auxiliary tasks.
– Our proposed method achieves outstanding performance on six benchmark
datasets with both intra- and cross-dataset testing protocols. We also con-
duct fine-grained material recognition experiments on SiW-M dataset to val-
idate the effectiveness of our proposed method.
2 Related Work
2.1 Face Anti-Spoofing
Traditional face anti-spoofing methods usually extract hand-crafted features
from the facial images to capture the spoofing patterns. Several classical lo-
cal descriptors such as LBP [2,4], SIFT [7], SURF [19], HOG [5] and DoG [6] are
utilized to extract frame level features while video level methods usually capture
dynamic cues like dynamic texture [20], micro–motion [21] and eye blinking [22].
More recently, a few deep learning based methods are proposed for FAS task.
Some frame-level CNN methods [23,24,25,26,11,27] are supervised by binary
scalars or pixel-wise binary maps. In contrast, auxiliary depth [10,16,14] and re-
flection [28] supervisions are introduced to learn detailed cues effectively. In order
to learn generalized features for unseen attacks and environment, few-shot learn-
ing [8], zero-shot learning [8,29] and domain generalization [30,31,32] are intro-
duced for FAS task. Meanwhile, several video-level CNN methods are presented
to exploit the dynamic spatio-temporal [9,33,34,35] or rPPG [13,14,12,36,37,38]
features for PAD. Despite introducing task-oriented priori knowledge (e.g., aux-
iliary depth, reflection and rPPG), deep learning based methods are still difficult
to extract rich intrinsic features among live faces and various kinds of PAs.
2.2 Human and Machine Material Perception
Our world consists of not only objects and scenes but also of materials of vari-
ous kinds. The perception of materials by humans usually focuses on optical and
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Fig. 2. The overall framework consists of Bilateral Convolutional Networks (BCN),
Multi-level Feature Refinement Module (MFRM) and multi-head supervision.
mechanical properties. Maloney and Brainard [39] demonstrates the research
concerns about perception of material surface properties other than color and
lightness, such as gloss or roughness. Fleming [40] proposes statistical appear-
ance models to describe visual perception of materials. Nishida [41] presents that
material perception is visual estimation of optical modulation of image statistics.
Inspired by human material perception, several machine intelligent methods are
designed for material classification. Techniques derived from the domain of tex-
ture analysis can be adopted for material recognition by machines [42]. Varma
and Zisserman [43] utilizes joint distribution of intensity values over image patch
exemplars for material classification under unknown viewpoint and illumination.
Sharan et al. [1] uses bilateral based low and mid-level image features for material
recognition. Aiming to keep the details of features, deep dilated convolutional
network is used for material perception [44].
In terms of vision applications, concepts of human material perception have
been developed into image quality assessment [45] and video quality assessment
[46]. For face anti-spoofing task, few works [17,18,47] consider discrepant surface
reflectance properties of live or spoofing faces. However, only considering surface
reflectance properties is not always reliable for material perception [1]. In order
to learn more generalized material-based features for FAS, we combine the state-
of-the-art FAS methods with classical human material perception[1].
3 Methodology
In this section, we first introduce the Bilateral Convolutional Networks (BCN)
in Section 3.1, then present Multi-level Feature Refinement Module (MFRM) in
Section 3.2, and at last introduce the material based multi-head supervision for
face anti-spoofing in Section 3.3. The overall framework is shown in Fig. 2.
3.1 Bilateral Convolutional Networks
Inspired by classical material perception [1] that utilizes bilateral filtering [48]
for exacting subsequent macro- and micro- features, we try to adopt bilateral
filtering technique for FAS task. The main issue is that in [1], several hand-
crafted features are designed after bilateral filtering, which limits the feature
representation capacity. In this subsection, we propose two solutions to integrate
bilateral filtering with the state-of-the-art deep networks for FAS task.
Bilateral Filtering. The first solution is straightforward: The bilateral
filtered frames are taken as network inputs instead of the original RGB frames.
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Original Bi_Base Bi_Residual Original Bi_Base Bi_Residual Original Bi_Base Bi_Residual
(a) Living  (b) Print Attack  (c) Replay Attack 
Fig. 3. Samples visualization for (a) live faces, (b) print attack, and (c) replay attack.
‘Bi Base’ denotes frames after bilateral filtering while ‘Bi Residual’ denotes residual
result between original and bilateral filtered frames respectively. The intensity values
of bilateral residual images are enlarged by four times for better visual effects.
The bilateral filter is utilized to smooth the original frame while preserving its
main edges. Each pixel is a weighted mean of its neighbors where the weights
decrease with the distance in space and with the intensity difference. With Gaus-
sian function gσ(x)) = exp(−x2/σ2), the bilateral filter of image I at pixel p is
defined by:
Bi Base(I)p =
1
k
∑
q∈I
gσs(‖p− q‖)gσr (|Ip − Iq|)Iq,
with : k =
∑
q∈I
gσs(‖p− q‖)gσr (|Ip − Iq|),
(1)
where σs and σr control the influence of spatial neighborhood distance and
intensity difference respectively, and k normalizes the weights. Give the input
image I, bilateral filter is able to create a two-scale decomposition [49] where
the output of the filter produces a large-scale base image Bi Base(I) and the
residual detail image Bi Residual(I) can be obtained by Bi Residual(I) = I −
Bi Base(I). We use the fast approximation version1 of the bilateral filter [50]
with default parameters for implementation.
Typical samples before and after bilateral filtering are visualized in Figure 3.
There are obvious differences in bilateral base and residual images between live
and spoofing faces despite their similarities in the original RGB images. As
shown in Fig. 3(b) ‘Bi Base’, the print attack face made of paper material is
rougher and less glossy. Moreover, it can be seen from Fig. 3(b)(c) ‘Bi Residual’
that the high-frequency activation in eyes and eyebrow region is stronger, which
might be caused by discrepant surface reflectance properties among materials
(e.g., skin, paper and glass). These visual evidences are consistent with classical
human material perception [1] that macro- cues from bilateral base and micro-
cues from bilateral residual are helpful for material perception.
In this paper, Auxiliary(Depth) [14] is chosen as our baseline deep model.
The bilateral filtered (i.e., bilateral base and residual) images can forward the
baseline model directly and predict the corresponding results. The ablation study
of different kinds of inputs will be discussed in Section 4.3.
Deep Bilateral Networks. The drawbacks of the above-mentioned solu-
tion are mainly of two folds: 1) directly replacing original inputs with bilateral
1 http://people.csail.mit.edu/jiawen/software/bilateralFilter-1.0.m
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images might lead to information loss, which limits the feature representation
capability for neural networks, and 2) it is an inefficient way to learn multi-level
bilateral features as the bilateral filter is only adopted in the input space. Aim-
ing to overcome these drawbacks, we propose a novel method called Bilateral
Convolutional Networks (BCN) to integrate traditional bilateral filtering with
deep networks properly.
In order to filter the deep features instead of original images, the deep bi-
lateral operator (DBO) is introduced. Mimicking the process of gray-scale or
color image filtering, given the deep feature maps F ∈ RH×W×C with height
H, width W and C channels, channel-wise deep bilateral filtering is operated.
Considering the small spatial distance for the widely used convolution with 3×3
kernel, the distance decay term in Eqn. (1) can be removed (see Appendix A
for corresponding ablation study), which is more efficient and lightweight when
operating in deep hidden space. Hence deep bilateral operator for each channel
of F can be formulated as
DBO(F)p = 1
k
∑
q∈F
gσr (|Fp −Fq|)Fq,
with : k =
∑
q∈F
gσr (|Fp −Fq|).
(2)
Now performing DBO for features in different levels, it is easy to obtain
multi-level bilateral base features. Nevertheless, how to get multi-level bilateral
residual features is still unknown. As our goal is to represent aggregated bilat-
eral base and residual features FBi, inspired by residual learning in ResNet [51],
bilateral residual features FResidual can be learned dynamically via shortcut
connecting with bilateral base features FBase, i.e., FResidual = FBi − FBase.
The architecture of the proposed Bilateral Convolutional Networks is illustrated
in Figure 4. As ‘BilateralConvBlock’ and ‘ConvBlock’ have same convolutional
structure but unshared parameters, it is possible to learn FBase and FResidual
from ‘BilateralConvBlock’ and ‘ConvBlock’ respectively. Compared with base-
line model Auxiliary(Depth) [14] without ‘BilateralConvBlock’, BCN is able to
learn more intrinsic features via aggregating multi-level bilateral macro- and
micro- information.
3.2 Multi-level Feature Refinement Module
In the baseline model Auxiliary(Depth) [14], multi-level features are concate-
nated directly for subsequent head supervision. We argue that such coarse fea-
tures are not optimal for fine-grained material-based FAS task. Hence Multi-
level Feature Refinement Module (MFRM) is introduced after BCN (see Fig. 2
), which aims to refine and fuse the coarse low-mid-high level features from BCN
via context-aware feature reassembling.
As illustrated in Fig. 5, features F from low-mid-high levels are refined via re-
assembling features with local context-aware weights. Unlike [52] which aims for
feature upsampling, here we focus on the general multi-level feature refinement.
The refined features F ′ can be formulated as
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Fig. 4. The proposed BCN architecture. The number of filters are shown on top of
each convolutional layer, the size of all filters is 3×3 with stride 1 for convolutional
and 2 for pooling layers. Each output from ‘ConvBlock’ and ‘BilateralConvBlock’ in
the same level will be operated with element-wise addition.
F ′level = Flevel ⊗ N ( ψ(φ(Flevel))), level ∈ {low,mid, high} , (3)
where φ, ψ, N and ⊗ represent channel compressor, content encoder, kernel
normalizer and refinement operator, respectively. The channel compressor adopts
a 1×1 convolution layer to compress the input feature channel from C to C ′,
making the refinement module more efficient. The content encoder utilizes a
convolution layer of kernel size 5×5 to generate refinement kernels based on
the content of input features F , and then each K × K refinement kernel is
normalized with a softmax function spatially in kernel normalizer. Given the
location l = (i, j), channel c and corresponding normalized refinement kernel
Wl, the output refined features F ′ are expressed as
F ′(i,j,c) =
r∑
n=−r
r∑
m=−r
Wl(n,m) · F(i+n,j+m,c), with r = bK/2c . (4)
In essence, MFRM exploits the semantic and contextual information to reallo-
cate the contributions of the local neighbors, which is possible to obtain more
intrinsic features. For instance, our module is able to refine the discriminative
cues (e.g. moire´ pattern) from salient regions according to their local context.
We also compare the refinement method with other classical feature attention
based methods such as spatial attention [53], channel attention [54] and non-local
attention [55] in Sec. 4.3.
3.3 Material based Multi-head Supervision
As material categorization is complex and depends on various fine-grained cues
(e.g., surface shape, reflectance and texture), it is impossible to learn robust and
intrinsic material-based patterns via only one simple supervision (e.g., softmax
binary loss and depth regression loss). For the sake of learning intrinsic material-
based features, material based multi-head supervision is proposed. As shown in
Fig. 2, three-head supervision is utilized to guide the multi-level fused features
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Fig. 5. Multi-level Feature Refinement Module.
from MFRM: 1) depth-head supervision, intending to force the model to learn
structural surface shape information; 2) reflection-head supervision, helping net-
works to learn surface reflectance property; and 3) patch-head supervision, guid-
ing to learn fine-grained surface texture cues. The detailed network structure can
be found in Appendix B.
Loss Function. Appropriate loss functions should be designed to supervise
the network training. Given an input face image I, the network predicts the depth
map Dpre, reflection map Rpre and patch map Ppre. Then the loss functions can
be formulated as:
Ldepth = 1
H ×W
∑
i∈H,j∈W
∥∥Dpre(i,j) −Dgt(i,j)∥∥22 , (5)
Lreflection = 1
H ×W × C
∑
i∈H,j∈W,c∈C
∥∥Rpre(i,j,c) −Rgt(i,j,c)∥∥22 , (6)
Lpatch = 1
H ×W
∑
i∈H,j∈W
−(Pgt(i,j)log(Ppre(i,j)) + (1−Pgt(i,j))log(1−Ppre(i,j))), (7)
where Dgt, Rgt and Pgt denote ground truth depth map, reflection map and
patch map respectively. Finally, the overall loss function is Loverall = Ldepth +
Lreflection + Lpatch.
Ground Truth Generation. Dense face alignment PRNet [56] is adopted
to estimate facial 3D shapes and generate the facial depth maps with size 32×32.
The reflection maps are estimated by the state-of-the-art reflection estimation
network [57] and then face regions are cropped from reflection maps to avoid
being overfitted to backgrounds. The generated reflection maps have size with
32 × 32 × 3 (3 channels for RGB). More details and samples can be found in
[33,28]. To distinguish live faces from spoofing faces, at the training stage, we
normalize live depth maps and spoofing reflection maps in a range of [0, 1], while
setting spoofing depth maps and live reflection maps to 0, which is similar to
[14,28]. The patch maps are generated simply by downsampling original images
and filling each patch position with corresponding binary label (i.e., live 1 and
spoofing 0). The generated binary patch maps keep size with 32× 32.
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4 Experiments
In this section, comprehensive experiments are performed to evaluate our method.
We will sequentially describe the employed datasets & metrics (Sec. 4.1), imple-
mentation details (Sec. 4.2), results (Sec. 4.3 - 4.5) and analysis (Sec. 4.6).
4.1 Datasets and Metrics
Six databases including OULU-NPU [58], SiW [14], CASIA-MFSD [59],
Replay-Attack [60], MSU-MFSD [61] and SiW-M [29] are used in our ex-
periments. OULU-NPU and SiW are large-scale high-resolution databases, con-
taining four and three protocols to validate the generalization (e.g., unseen illu-
mination and attack medium) of models respectively, which are utilized for intra
testing. CASIA-MFSD, Replay-Attack and MSU-MFSD are databases which
contain low-resolution videos, and are used for cross testing. SiW-M is designed
for fine-grained material recognition and cross-type testing for unseen attacks as
there are rich attacks types (totally 13 types) inside.
Performance Metrics. In OULU-NPU and SiW dataset, we follow the
original protocols and metrics, i.e., Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate
(APCER), Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER), and
ACER [62] for a fair comparison. Half Total Error Rate (HTER) is adopted in
the cross testing between CASIA-MFSD and Replay-Attack. Area Under Curve
(AUC) is utilized for intra-database cross-type test on CASIA-MFSD, Replay-
Attack and MSU-MFSD. For the cross-type test on SiW-M, APCER, BPCER,
ACER and Equal Error Rate (EER) are employed.
4.2 Implementation Details
Our proposed method is implemented with Pytorch. The default settings σr =
1.0 and C ′ = 20,K = 5 are adopted for BCN and MFRM, respectively. In the
training stage, models are trained with Adam optimizer and the initial learning
rate (lr) and weight decay (wd) are 1e-4 and 5e-5, respectively. We train models
with maximum 1300 epochs while lr halves every 500 epochs. The batch size is
7 on a Nvidia P100 GPU. In the testing stage, we calculate the mean value of
the predicted depth map Dtest, reflection map Rtest and patch map Ptest as the
final score Stest:
Stest = mean(Dtest) +mean(1−Rtest) +mean(Ptest). (8)
4.3 Ablation Study
In this subsection, all ablation studies are conducted on Protocol-1 (different illu-
mination condition and location between train and test sets) of OULU-NPU [58]
to explore the details of our proposed BCN, MFRM and multi-head supervision.
Impact of σr and Bilateral Operator in BCN. According to Eqn. (2)
and Gaussian function gσr (x)) = exp(−x2/σ2r), σr controls the strength of neigh-
bor feature differences, i.e., the higher σr, the more contributions are given to the
neighbor with large differences. As illustrated in Fig. 6(a), the best performance
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Fig. 6. (a) Impact of σr in BCN. (b) Comparison among various kinds of inputs for
baseline model Auxilary(Depth) [14] and BCN. Lower ACER, better performance.
Table 1. Results of network com-
position and supervision.
Model ACER(%)
D (Baseline) 4.1
D+R 2.8
D+P 2.3
D+R+P 1.8
D+R+P+MFRM 1.2
D+R+P+MFRM+BCN 0.8
Table 2. Ablation study of refinement meth-
ods in MFRM.
Model ACER(%)
D+R+P 1.8
D+R+P+Spatial Attention [53] 1.5
D+R+P+Channel Attention [54] 9.5
D+R+P+Non-local Attention [55] 12.7
D+R+P+Context-aware Reassembling 1.2
(ACER=2.1%) is obtained when σ2r = 1.0 in BCN. We use this setting for the
following experiments. According to the quantitative index shown in Fig. 6(b),
BCN (ACER=2.1%) could decrease the ACER by half when campared with the
results of ‘RGB Baseline’ (ACER=4.1%). In order to validate whether the im-
provement from BCN is due to the extra parameters from ‘BilateralConvBlock’
in Fig. 4, we remove the bilateral operator in these blocks. However, as shown
in Fig. 6(b) ‘BCN w/o Bilateral’, it even works worse than the baseline (4.3%
versus 4.1% ACER), indicating that the network easily overfits by introducing
extra parameters without bilateral operators. We are also curious about the effi-
cacy of bilateral residual term. After removing bilateral residual structure from
BCN, the ACER index sharply changes from 2.1% (see ‘BCN’) to 4.0% (see
‘BCN w/o Residual’). It implies that the micro- patterns from bilateral residual
branch are also important for FAS task.
Influence of Various Input Types. As discussed in Sec. 3.1, the first
solution is to adopt bilateral filtered images as network inputs. The results in
Fig. 6(b) show that ‘Bi Residual Baseline’ with bilateral residual inputs performs
better (0.4% ACER lower) than that of original RGB baseline. While combing
the multi-level features from both original RGB and bilateral filtered images
(i.e., ‘RGB+Bi Base Baseline’ and ‘RGB+Bi Residual Baseline’ in Fig. 6(b)),
the performance further boosts. In contrast, BCN with only original RGB input
outperforms the first solution methods for a large margin, implying that deep
bilateral base and residual features in BCN are more robust.
Advantage of MFRM and Multi-head Supervision. Table 1 shows
the ablation study about the network composition and supervision. ‘D’, ‘R’,
‘P’ are short for depth, reflection and patch heads, respectively. It is clear that
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Table 3. The results of intra testing on four protocols of OULU-NPU.
Prot. Method APCER(%)↓ BPCER(%)↓ ACER(%)↓
1
GRADIANT [63] 1.3 12.5 6.9
BASN [28] 1.5 5.8 3.6
STASN [34] 1.2 2.5 1.9
Auxiliary [14] 1.6 1.6 1.6
FaceDs [11] 1.2 1.7 1.5
FAS-TD [33] 2.5 0.0 1.3
DeepPixBiS [26] 0.8 0.0 0.4
Ours 0.0 1.6 0.8
2
DeepPixBiS [26] 11.4 0.6 6.0
FaceDs [11] 4.2 4.4 4.3
Auxiliary [14] 2.7 2.7 2.7
BASN [28] 2.4 3.1 2.7
GRADIANT [63] 3.1 1.9 2.5
STASN [34] 4.2 0.3 2.2
FAS-TD [33] 1.7 2.0 1.9
Ours 2.6 0.8 1.7
3
DeepPixBiS [26] 11.7±19.6 10.6±14.1 11.1±9.4
FAS-TD [33] 5.9±1.9 5.9±3.0 5.9±1.0
GRADIANT [63] 2.6±3.9 5.0±5.3 3.8±2.4
BASN [28] 1.8±1.1 3.6±3.5 2.7±1.6
FaceDs [11] 4.0±1.8 3.8±1.2 3.6±1.6
Auxiliary [14] 2.7±1.3 3.1±1.7 2.9±1.5
STASN [34] 4.7±3.9 0.9±1.2 2.8±1.6
Ours 2.8±2.4 2.3±2.8 2.5±1.1
4
DeepPixBiS [26] 36.7±29.7 13.3±14.1 25.0±12.7
GRADIANT [63] 5.0±4.5 15.0±7.1 10.0±5.0
Auxiliary [14] 9.3±5.6 10.4±6.0 9.5±6.0
FAS-TD [33] 14.2±8.7 4.2±3.8 9.2±3.4
STASN [34] 6.7±10.6 8.3±8.4 7.5±4.7
FaceDs [11] 1.2±6.3 6.1±5.1 5.6±5.7
BASN [28] 6.4±8.6 3.2±5.3 4.8±6.4
Ours 2.9±4.0 7.5±6.9 5.2±3.7
multi-head supervision facilitates the network to learn more intrinsic features
thus boost the performance. Furthermore, with both MFRM and multi-head
supervision, our model is able to reduce ACER from baseline 4.1% to 1.2%.
Ultimately, the full version of our method ‘D+R+P+MFRM+BCN’ achieves
excellent performance with 0.8% ACER.
Impact of Refinement Methods in MFRM. We investigate four fea-
ture refinement methods in MFRM and the results are shown in Table 2. It is sur-
prised that only spatial attention [53] (the second row) boosts the performance
while SE block based channel attention [54] (the third row) and non-local block
based self-attention[55] (the fourth row) perform poorly when domain shifts
(e.g., illumination changes). We adopt context-aware reassembling as defaulted
setting in MFRM as it can obtain more generalized features and improve base-
line ‘D+R+P’ by 0.6% ACER. In summary, we use ‘D+R+P+MFRM+BCN
(with σ2r = 1.0)’ for all the following tests.
4.4 Intra Testing
The intra testing is carried out on both the OULU-NPU and the SiW datasets.
We strictly follow the four protocols on OULU-NPU and three protocols on SiW
for the evaluation. All compared methods including STASN [34] are trained
without extra datasets for a fair comparison.
Results on OULU-NPU. As shown in Table 3, our proposed method
ranks first or second on all the four protocols (0.4%, 1.7%, 2.5% and 5.2% ACER,
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Table 4. The evaluation and comparison of the cross-type testing on SiW-M [29].
Method Metrics(%) Replay Print
Mask Attacks Makeup Attacks Partial Attacks
Average
Half Silicone Trans. Paper Manne. Obfusc. Imperson. Cosmetic Funny Eye Paper Glasses Partial Paper
SVM+LBP [58]
APCER 19.1 15.4 40.8 20.3 70.3 0.0 4.6 96.9 35.3 11.3 53.3 58.5 0.6 32.8±29.8
BPCER 22.1 21.5 21.9 21.4 20.7 23.1 22.9 21.7 12.5 22.2 18.4 20.0 22.9 21.0±2.9
ACER 20.6 18.4 31.3 21.4 45.5 11.6 13.8 59.3 23.9 16.7 35.9 39.2 11.7 26.9±14.5
EER 20.8 18.6 36.3 21.4 37.2 7.5 14.1 51.2 19.8 16.1 34.4 33.0 7.9 24.5±12.9
Auxiliary [14]
APCER 23.7 7.3 27.7 18.2 97.8 8.3 16.2 100.0 18.0 16.3 91.8 72.2 0.4 38.3±37.4
BPCER 10.1 6.5 10.9 11.6 6.2 7.8 9.3 11.6 9.3 7.1 6.2 8.8 10.3 8.9± 2.0
ACER 16.8 6.9 19.3 14.9 52.1 8.0 12.8 55.8 13.7 11.7 49.0 40.5 5.3 23.6±18.5
EER 14.0 4.3 11.6 12.4 24.6 7.8 10.0 72.3 10.1 9.4 21.4 18.6 4.0 17.0±17.7
DTN [29]
APCER 1.0 0.0 0.7 24.5 58.6 0.5 3.8 73.2 13.2 12.4 17.0 17.0 0.2 17.1±23.3
BPCER 18.6 11.9 29.3 12.8 13.4 8.5 23.0 11.5 9.6 16.0 21.5 22.6 16.8 16.6 ±6.2
ACER 9.8 6.0 15.0 18.7 36.0 4.5 7.7 48.1 11.4 14.2 19.3 19.8 8.5 16.8 ±11.1
EER 10.0 2.1 14.4 18.6 26.5 5.7 9.6 50.2 10.1 13.2 19.8 20.5 8.8 16.1± 12.2
Ours
APCER 12.4 5.2 8.3 9.7 13.6 0.0 2.5 30.4 0.0 12.0 22.6 15.9 1.2 10.3±9.1
BPCER 13.2 6.2 13.1 10.8 16.3 3.9 2.3 34.1 1.6 13.9 23.2 17.1 2.3 12.2±9.4
ACER 12.8 5.7 10.7 10.3 14.9 1.9 2.4 32.3 0.8 12.9 22.9 16.5 1.7 11.2±9.2
EER 13.4 5.2 8.3 9.7 13.6 5.8 2.5 33.8 0.0 14.0 23.3 16.6 1.2 11.3±9.5
respectively), which indicates the proposed method performs well at the general-
ization of the external environment, attack mediums and input camera variation.
Note that DeepPixBis [26] utilizes patch map for supervision but performing
poorly in unseen attack mediums and camera types while BASN [26] exploits
depth and reflection map as guidance but ineffective in unseen external environ-
ment. Our method works well for all 4 protocols as the extracted material-based
features are intrinsic and generalized.
Results on SiW. We also compare our method with four state-of-the-
art methods [14,34,33,28] on SiW dataset. Our method performs the best for
all three protocols (0.36%, 0.11%, 2.45% ACER, respectively), revealing the
excellent generalization capacity for 1) variations of face pose and expression,
2) variations of different spoof mediums, and 3) unknown presentation attack.
More detailed results of each protocol are shown in Appendix C.
4.5 Inter Testing
To further validate whether our model is able to learn intrinsic features, we
conduct cross-type and cross-dataset testing to verify the generalization capacity
to unknown presentation attacks and unseen environment, respectively.
Cross-type Testing. Here we use CASIA-MFSD [59], Replay-Attack [60]
and MSU-MFSD [61] to perform intra-dataset cross-type testing between re-
play and print attacks. Our proposed method achieves the best overall perfor-
mance (96.77% AUC) among state-of-the-art methods [64,65,29,8], indicating
the learned features generalized well among unknown attacks. More details can
be found in Appendix D. Moreover, we also conduct cross-type testing on the lat-
est SiW-M [29] dataset. As illustrated in Table 4, the proposed method achieves
the best average ACER (11.2%) and EER (11.3%) among 13 attacks, which in-
dicates our method actually learns material-based intrinsic patterns from rich
kinds of material hence generalized well in unseen material type.
Cross-dataset Testing. In this experiment, we first train on the CASIA-
MFSD and test on Replay-Attack, which is named as protocol CR. And then
exchanging the training dataset and the testing dataset reciprocally, named pro-
tocol RC. As shown in Table 5, our proposed method has 16.6% HTER on
protocol CR, outperforming all prior state-of-the-arts. For protocol RC, we also
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Table 5. The results of cross-dataset testing between CASIA-MFSD and Replay-
Attack. The evaluation metric is HTER(%).
Method
Protocol CR Protocol RC
Train Test Train Test
CASIA-MFSD Replay-Attack Replay-Attack CASIA-MFSD
LBP-TOP [66] 49.7 60.6
STASN [34] 31.5 30.9
Color Texture [3] 30.3 37.7
FaceDs [11] 28.5 41.1
Auxiliary [14] 27.6 28.4
BASN [28] 23.6 29.9
FAS-TD [33] 17.5 24.0
Ours 16.6 36.4
Table 6. Fine-grained material recognition in SiW-M dataset. The evaluation metric
is accuracy (%).
Method Live Replay Print Mask Makeup Overall
ResNet50 (pre-trained) [51] 88.4 93.9 84.2 92.6 98.6 91.3
Patch (Ours) 91.5 98.0 87.7 95.9 73.9 90.1
Patch+BCN (Ours) 83.7 100.0 93.0 96.0 94.2 92.0
Patch+BCN+MFRM (Ours) 96.1 100.0 93.0 95.1 82.6 93.7
achieve comparable performance with 36.4% HTER. As our method is frame-
level based, the performance might be further improved via introducing the
temporal dynamic features in FAS-TD [33].
4.6 Analysis and Visualization.
In this subsection, we firstly conduct fine-grained material recognition on FAS
dataset to prove that the learned features are material-based and intrinsic. And
then we visualize and analyze the learned features.
Fine-grained Material Recognition. Face anti-spoofing is usually re-
garded as a binary classification problem despite we treat it as a binary material
perception problem (i.e., structural facial skin versus others) in this paper. It
is curious whether the model learns material-based intrinsic features despite it
achieves state-of-the-art performance in most FAS datasets. As there are rich
spoofing material types in SiW-M dataset, we separate it into five material cat-
egories, i.e., live, replay, print, mask and makeup, which are made of structural
facial skin, plain glass, wrapped paper, structural fiber and foundation, respec-
tively. Half samples of the each category are used for training and the remaining
parts are utilized for testing. Only patch map supervision with five categories is
utilized as the baseline because depth and reflection maps are not suitable for
multi-category classification. As shown in Table 6, with the BCN and MFRM,
the overall accuracy boosts by 1.9% and extra 1.7% respectively, outperform-
ing ResNet50 [51] pre-trained in ImageNet. It implies intrinsic patterns among
materials might be captured by BCN and MFRM.
Features Visualization. The low-level features of BCN and the predicted
maps are visualized in Fig. 7. It is clear that the bilateral base and residual
features between live and spoofing faces are quite different. For the bilateral
base features of print attacks (see the 2nd and 3rd column in Fig. 7), the random
noises in the hair region are obvious which is caused by the rough surface of the
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Fig. 7. Features visualization on live face (the first column) and spoofing faces (four
columns to the right). The six rows represent the RGB images, low-level bilateral base
features, low-level bilateral residual features in BCN, predicted depth maps, reflection
maps and patch maps, respectively. Best view when zoom in.
paper material. Moreover, the micro- patterns in bilateral residual features reveal
more details of facial outline in spoofing attacks but blurriness in live faces.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we rephrase face anti-spoofing (FAS) task as a material recognition
problem and combine FAS with classical human material perception [1]. To this
end, Bilateral Convolutional Networks are proposed for capturing material-based
bilateral macro- and micro- features. Extensive experiments are performed to
verify the effectiveness of the proposed method. Our future works include: 1) to
learn intrinsic material features via disentangling them with material-unrelated
features (e.g., face id and face attribute features); and 2) to establish a more
suitable cross-material based FAS benchmark.
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6 Appendix
A. Impact of Spatial Neighborhood Distance in DBO
The full version of deep bilateral operator (DBO) with spatial neighborhood
distance term can be formulated as
DBOfull(F)p = 1
k
∑
q∈F
gσs(‖p− q‖)gσr (|Fp −Fq|)Fq,
with : k =
∑
q∈F
gσs(‖p− q‖)gσr (|Fp −Fq|).
(9)
In this ablation study, the impact of spatial neighborhood distance gσs(‖p− q‖)
would be evaluated. Here the default setting σ2r = 1.0 is utilized. It can be seen
from Fig. 8 that there are no improvements (2.4% and 2.1% ACER for with and
without spatial neighborhood distance, respectively) when introducing spatial
neighborhood distance term into BCN.
Fig. 8. Impact of σs in BCN.
Note that the ablation study about distance term σs here is not enough thus
it might be a sub-optimal solution. The optimal hyperparameter setting could
be found via strict grid search, which is one of our future works. Long-range
spatial impact of distance term σs under large kernel size (e.g., 5x5 and 7x7) is
also worth exploring in future.
B. Network Details of Multi-head Supervision
The detailed convolutional layers are illustrated in Fig. 9. With the supervi-
sion from three kinds of cues, the backbone network is able to learn more holistic
material-based features.
Depth
Patch
Reflection
Input Features
32x32x300
32x32
32x32
32x32x3
100 50
100 50
100 50
150 1
Sigmoid
1
1
ReLU
ReLU
Fig. 9. Network structure of multi-head supervision. The number of filters are shown
on top of each convolution, the size of all filters is 3×3 with stride 1.
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C. Intra Testing Results on SiW
As shown in Table 7, the proposed method performs the best for all three
protocols, revealing the excellent generalization capacity.
Table 7. The results of intra testing on three protocols of SiW [14].
Prot. Method APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%)
1
Auxiliary [14] 3.58 3.58 3.58
STASN [34] – – 1.00
FAS-TD [33] 0.96 0.50 0.73
BASN [28] – – 0.37
Ours 0.55 0.17 0.36
2
Auxiliary [14] 0.57±0.69 0.57±0.69 0.57±0.69
STASN [34] – – 0.28±0.05
FAS-TD [33] 0.08±0.14 0.21±0.14 0.15±0.14
BASN [28] – – 0.12±0.03
Ours 0.08±0.17 0.15±0.00 0.11±0.08
3
STASN [34] – – 12.10±1.50
Auxiliary [14] 8.31±3.81 8.31±3.80 8.31±3.81
BASN [28] – – 6.45±1.80
FAS-TD [33] 3.10±0.81 3.09±0.81 3.10±0.81
Ours 2.55±0.89 2.34±0.47 2.45±0.68
D. Cross-type Testing on CASIA-MFSD, Replay-Attack and MSU-
MFSD
In these cross-type testing, three datasets CASIA-MFSD [59], Replay-Attack [60]
and MSU-MFSD [61] are utilized to perform intra-dataset cross-type testing
between replay and print attacks. For instance, the second column ‘Video’ in
Table 8 means that model should be trained from ‘Cut Photo’ and ‘Wrapped
Photo’ while tested on ‘Video’. Table 8 shows that our proposed method achieves
the best overall performance (96.77% AUC), indicating the learned features gen-
eralized well among unknown attacks.
Table 8. Cross-type testing on CASIA-MFSD, Replay-Attack, and MSU-MFSD. The
evaluation metric is AUC (%).
Method
CASIA-MFSD [59] Replay-Attack [60] MSU-MFSD [61]
Overall
Video Cut Photo Wrapped Photo Video Digital Photo Printed Photo Printed Photo HR Video Mobile Video
OC-SVM+BSIF [64] 70.74 60.73 95.90 84.03 88.14 73.66 64.81 87.44 74.69 78.68±11.74
SVM+LBP [58] 91.94 91.70 84.47 99.08 98.17 87.28 47.68 99.50 97.61 88.55±16.25
NN+LBP [65] 94.16 88.39 79.85 99.75 95.17 78.86 50.57 99.93 93.54 86.69±16.25
DTN [29] 90.0 97.3 97.5 99.9 99.9 99.6 81.6 99.9 97.5 95.9±6.2
AIM-FAS [8] 93.6 99.7 99.1 99.8 99.9 99.8 76.3 99.9 99.1 96.4±7.8
Ours 99.62 100.00 100.00 99.99 99.74 99.91 71.64 100.00 99.99 96.77±9.99
Face Anti-Spoofing with Human Material Perception 17
References
1. Sharan, L., Liu, C., Rosenholtz, R., Adelson, E.H.: Recognizing materials using
perceptually inspired features. International journal of computer vision 103(3)
(2013) 348–371 1, 3, 4, 5, 14
2. Boulkenafet, Z., Komulainen, J., Hadid, A.: Face anti-spoofing based on color
texture analysis. In: IEEE international conference on image processing (ICIP).
(2015) 2636–2640 1, 3
3. Boulkenafet, Z., Komulainen, J., Hadid, A.: Face spoofing detection using colour
texture analysis. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 11(8)
(2016) 1818–1830 1, 13
4. de Freitas Pereira, T., Anjos, A., De Martino, J.M., Marcel, S.: Lbp- top based
countermeasure against face spoofing attacks. In: Asian Conference on Computer
Vision. (2012) 121–132 1, 3
5. Komulainen, J., Hadid, A., Pietikainen, M.: Context based face anti-spoofing. In:
2013 IEEE Sixth International Conference on Biometrics: Theory, Applications
and Systems (BTAS). (2013) 1–8 1, 3
6. Peixoto, B., Michelassi, C., Rocha, A.: Face liveness detection under bad illumi-
nation conditions. In: ICIP, IEEE (2011) 3557–3560 1, 3
7. Patel, K., Han, H., Jain, A.K.: Secure face unlock: Spoof detection on smartphones.
IEEE transactions on information forensics and security 11(10) (2016) 2268–2283
1, 3
8. Qin, Y., Zhao, C., Zhu, X., Wang, Z., Yu, Z., Fu, T., Zhou, F., Shi, J., Lei, Z.:
Learning meta model for zero-and few-shot face anti-spoofing. The Thirty-Fourth
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) (2020) 1, 3, 12, 16
9. Wang, Z., Yu, Z., Zhao, C., Zhu, X., Qin, Y., Zhou, Q., Zhou, F., Lei, Z.: Deep
spatial gradient and temporal depth learning for face anti-spoofing. In: Proceedings
of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. (2020)
5042–5051 1, 3
10. Yu, Z., Zhao, C., Wang, Z., Qin, Y., Su, Z., Li, X., Zhou, F., Zhao, G.: Searching
central difference convolutional networks for face anti-spoofing. In: Proceedings of
the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. (2020)
5295–5305 1, 3
11. Jourabloo, A., Liu, Y., Liu, X.: Face de-spoofing: Anti-spoofing via noise modeling.
In: Proceedings of the European Conference on Computer Vision (ECCV). (2018)
290–306 1, 3, 11, 13
12. Lin, B., Li, X., Yu, Z., Zhao, G.: Face liveness detection by rppg features and con-
textual patch-based cnn. In: Proceedings of the 2019 3rd International Conference
on Biometric Engineering and Applications, ACM (2019) 61–68 2, 3
13. Li, X., Komulainen, J., Zhao, G., Yuen, P.C., Pietika¨inen, M.: Generalized face
anti-spoofing by detecting pulse from face videos. In: 2016 23rd International
Conference on Pattern Recognition (ICPR), IEEE (2016) 4244–4249 2, 3
14. Liu, Y., Jourabloo, A., Liu, X.: Learning deep models for face anti-spoofing: Binary
or auxiliary supervision. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition. (2018) 389–398 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16
15. Liu, S.Q., Lan, X., Yuen, P.C.: Remote photoplethysmography correspondence
feature for 3d mask face presentation attack detection. In: Proceedings of the
European Conference on Computer Vision (ECCV). (2018) 558–573 2
16. Atoum, Y., Liu, Y., Jourabloo, A., Liu, X.: Face anti-spoofing using patch and
depth-based cnns. In: 2017 IEEE International Joint Conference on Biometrics
(IJCB). (2017) 319–328 2, 3
18 Zitong Yu1, Xiaobai Li1, Xuesong Niu 2,3, Jingang Shi4,1, Guoying Zhao1
17. Tan, X., Li, Y., Liu, J., Jiang, L.: Face liveness detection from a single image
with sparse low rank bilinear discriminative model. In: European Conference on
Computer Vision, Springer (2010) 504–517 2, 4
18. Li, L., Xia, Z., Jiang, X., Ma, Y., Roli, F., Feng, X.: 3d face mask presentation
attack detection based on intrinsic image analysis. arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.11303
(2019) 2, 4
19. Boulkenafet, Z., Komulainen, J., Hadid, A.: Face antispoofing using speeded-up
robust features and fisher vector encoding. IEEE Signal Processing Letters 24(2)
(2017) 141–145 3
20. Komulainen, J., Hadid, A., Pietika¨inen, M.: Face spoofing detection using dynamic
texture. In: Asian Conference on Computer Vision, Springer (2012) 146–157 3
21. Siddiqui, T.A., Bharadwaj, S., Dhamecha, T.I., Agarwal, A., Vatsa, M., Singh, R.,
Ratha, N.: Face anti-spoofing with multifeature videolet aggregation. In: 2016 23rd
International Conference on Pattern Recognition (ICPR), IEEE (2016) 1035–1040
3
22. Pan, G., Sun, L., Wu, Z., Lao, S.: Eyeblink-based anti-spoofing in face recognition
from a generic webcamera. In: IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision.
(2007) 1–8 3
23. Yu, Z., Qin, Y., Xu, X., Zhao, C., Wang, Z., Lei, Z., Zhao, G.: Auto-fas: Searching
lightweight networks for face anti-spoofing. In: ICASSP 2020-2020 IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), IEEE
(2020) 996–1000 3
24. Li, L., Feng, X., Boulkenafet, Z., Xia, Z., Li, M., Hadid, A.: An original face anti-
spoofing approach using partial convolutional neural network. In: IPTA. (2016)
1–6 3
25. Patel, K., Han, H., Jain, A.K.: Cross-database face antispoofing with robust feature
representation. In: Chinese Conference on Biometric Recognition. (2016) 611–619
3
26. George, A., Marcel, S.: Deep pixel-wise binary supervision for face presentation at-
tack detection. In: International Conference on Biometrics. Number CONF (2019)
3, 11, 12
27. Yu, Z., Qin, Y., Li, X., Wang, Z., Zhao, C., Lei, Z., Zhao, G.: Multi-modal face anti-
spoofing based on central difference networks. In: Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops. (2020) 650–
651 3
28. Kim, T., Kim, Y., Kim, I., Kim, D.: Basn: Enriching feature representation using
bipartite auxiliary supervisions for face anti-spoofing. In: Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Computer Vision Workshops. (2019) 0–0 3, 8, 11, 12,
13, 16
29. Liu, Y., Stehouwer, J., Jourabloo, A., Liu, X.: Deep tree learning for zero-shot
face anti-spoofing. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition. (2019) 4680–4689 3, 9, 12, 16
30. Jia, Y., Zhang, J., Shan, S., Chen, X.: Single-side domain generalization for face
anti-spoofing. In: Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition. (2020) 8484–8493 3
31. Wang, G., Han, H., Shan, S., Chen, X.: Cross-domain face presentation attack
detection via multi-domain disentangled representation learning. In: Proceedings
of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. (2020)
6678–6687 3
Face Anti-Spoofing with Human Material Perception 19
32. Shao, R., Lan, X., Li, J., Yuen, P.C.: Multi-adversarial discriminative deep domain
generalization for face presentation attack detection. In: Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. (2019) 10023–10031 3
33. Wang, Z., Zhao, C., Qin, Y., Zhou, Q., Lei, Z.: Exploiting temporal and depth
information for multi-frame face anti-spoofing. arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.05118
(2018) 3, 8, 11, 12, 13, 16
34. Yang, X., Luo, W., Bao, L., Gao, Y., Gong, D., Zheng, S., Li, Z., Liu, W.: Face anti-
spoofing: Model matters, so does data. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. (2019) 3, 11, 12, 13, 16
35. Lin, C., Liao, Z., Zhou, P., Hu, J., Ni, B.: Live face verification with multiple
instantialized local homographic parameterization. In: IJCAI. (2018) 814–820 3
36. Yu, Z., Li, X., Zhao, G.: Remote photoplethysmograph signal measurement from
facial videos using spatio-temporal networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.02419
(2019) 3
37. Yu, Z., Li, X., Niu, X., Shi, J., Zhao, G.: Autohr: A strong end-to-end base-
line for remote heart rate measurement with neural searching. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2004.12292 (2020) 3
38. Yu, Z., Peng, W., Li, X., Hong, X., Zhao, G.: Remote heart rate measurement from
highly compressed facial videos: an end-to-end deep learning solution with video
enhancement. In: Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer
Vision. (2019) 151–160 3
39. Maloney, L.T., Brainard, D.H.: Color and material perception: Achievements and
challenges. Journal of Vision 10(9) (2010) 19–19 4
40. Fleming, R.W.: Visual perception of materials and their properties. Vision research
94 (2014) 62–75 4
41. Nishida, S.: Image statistics for material perception. Current Opinion in Behavioral
Sciences 30 (2019) 94–99 4
42. Adelson, E.H.: On seeing stuff: the perception of materials by humans and ma-
chines. In: Human vision and electronic imaging VI. Volume 4299., International
Society for Optics and Photonics (2001) 1–12 4
43. Varma, M., Zisserman, A.: A statistical approach to material classification us-
ing image patch exemplars. IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and machine
intelligence 31(11) (2008) 2032–2047 4
44. Jiang, X., Du, J., Sun, B., Feng, X.: Deep dilated convolutional network for material
recognition. In: 2018 Eighth International Conference on Image Processing Theory,
Tools and Applications (IPTA), IEEE (2018) 1–6 4
45. Ling, S., Callet, P.L., Yu, Z.: The role of structure and textural information in
image utility and quality assessment tasks. Electronic Imaging 2018(14) (2018)
1–13 4
46. Deng, B.W., Yu, Z.T., Ling, B.W., Yang, Z.: Video quality assessment based on
features for semantic task and human material perception. In: 2016 IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Consumer Electronics-China (ICCE-China), IEEE (2016)
1–4 4
47. Li, L., Xia, Z., Jiang, X., Ma, Y., Roli, F., Feng, X.: 3d face mask presentation
attack detection based on intrinsic image analysis. IET Biometrics 9(3) (2020)
100–108 4
48. Tomasi, C., Manduchi, R.: Bilateral filtering for gray and color images. In: Iccv.
Volume 98. (1998) 2 4
49. Durand, F., Dorsey, J.: Fast bilateral filtering for the display of high-dynamic-
range images. In: ACM transactions on graphics (TOG). Volume 21., ACM (2002)
257–266 5
20 Zitong Yu1, Xiaobai Li1, Xuesong Niu 2,3, Jingang Shi4,1, Guoying Zhao1
50. Paris, S., Durand, F.: A fast approximation of the bilateral filter using a signal
processing approach. In: European conference on computer vision, Springer (2006)
568–580 5
51. He, K., Zhang, X., Ren, S., Sun, J.: Deep residual learning for image recognition.
In: Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition.
(2016) 770–778 6, 13
52. Wang, J., Chen, K., Xu, R., Liu, Z., Loy, C.C., Lin, D.: Carafe: Content-aware
reassembly of features. arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.02188 (2019) 6
53. Woo, S., Park, J., Lee, J.Y., So Kweon, I.: Cbam: Convolutional block attention
module. In: Proceedings of the European Conference on Computer Vision (ECCV).
(2018) 3–19 7, 10, 11
54. Hu, J., Shen, L., Sun, G.: Squeeze-and-excitation networks. In: Proceedings of the
IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition. (2018) 7132–7141 7,
10, 11
55. Wang, X., Girshick, R., Gupta, A., He, K.: Non-local neural networks. In: Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition.
(2018) 7794–7803 7, 10, 11
56. Feng, Y., Wu, F., Shao, X., Wang, Y., Zhou, X.: Joint 3d face reconstruction
and dense alignment with position map regression network. In: Proceedings of the
European Conference on Computer Vision (ECCV). (2017) 8
57. Zhang, X., Ng, R., Chen, Q.: Single image reflection separation with perceptual
losses. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition. (2018) 4786–4794 8
58. Boulkenafet, Z., Komulainen, J., Li, L., Feng, X., Hadid, A.: Oulu-npu: A mobile
face presentation attack database with real-world variations. In: FGR. (2017) 612–
618 9, 12, 16
59. Zhang, Z., Yan, J., Liu, S., Lei, Z., Yi, D., Li, S.Z.: A face antispoofing database
with diverse attacks. In: ICB. (2012) 26–31 9, 12, 16
60. Chingovska, I., Anjos, A., Marcel, S.: On the effectiveness of local binary patterns
in face anti-spoofing. In: Biometrics Special Interest Group. (2012) 1–7 9, 12, 16
61. Wen, D., Han, H., Jain, A.K.: Face spoof detection with image distortion analysis.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 10(4) (2015) 746–761
9, 12, 16
62. international organization for standardization: Iso/iec jtc 1/sc 37 biometrics: In-
formation technology biometric presentation attack detection part 1: Framework.
In: https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/iso. (2016) 9
63. Boulkenafet, Z., Komulainen, J., Akhtar, Z., Benlamoudi, A., Samai, D.,
Bekhouche, S.E., Ouafi, A., Dornaika, F., Taleb-Ahmed, A., Qin, L., et al.: A
competition on generalized software-based face presentation attack detection in
mobile scenarios. In: 2017 IEEE International Joint Conference on Biometrics
(IJCB), IEEE (2017) 688–696 11
64. Arashloo, S.R., Kittler, J., Christmas, W.: An anomaly detection approach to face
spoofing detection: A new formulation and evaluation protocol. IEEE Access 5
(2017) 13868–13882 12, 16
65. Xiong, F., AbdAlmageed, W.: Unknown presentation attack detection with face
rgb images. In: 2018 IEEE 9th International Conference on Biometrics Theory,
Applications and Systems (BTAS), IEEE (2018) 1–9 12, 16
66. de Freitas Pereira, T., Anjos, A., De Martino, J.M., Marcel, S.: Can face anti-
spoofing countermeasures work in a real world scenario? In: 2013 international
conference on biometrics (ICB). (2013) 1–8 13
